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WILSON v. ARKANSAS AND THE
KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE RULE:
GIVING CONTENT TO THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
I. Introduction
In Wilson v. Arkansas,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the
common law 'knock and announce' principle2 forms part of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment."3 By so holding,
the Court attempted to give "content" to the Fourth Amendment4
requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable.' The Court also
limited its holding, however, and stated that "not ... every entry must
be preceded by an announcement, '"6 in light of strong government
interests such as the existence of a threat of physical violence against an
officer or the likelihood of the destruction of evidence.7 However, the
Court stopped short of giving a "comprehensive catalog of [such]
115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995).
2 For a discussion of the knock and announce principle, see infra notes 79 to 141 and
accompanying text.
Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1915.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1916.
6 Id. at 1918.
' Id. at 1918-19.
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relevant countervailing factors."' Instead, the Court left to the lower
courts "the task of determining the circumstances under which an
unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."9
A. Facts of Wilson v. Arkansas
In late 1992, Sharlene Wilson made several narcotics sales to an
Arkansas State Police informant.' Wilson consummated some of these
sales at her home, which she shared with Bryson Jacobs." On the final
occasion, Wilson waived a semi-automatic pistol in the informant's face,
threatening to kill the informant if she were working for the police.'2
The next day, the police obtained search and arrest warrants to search
Wilson's home and arrest her and Jacobs. 3 When the officers arrived at
Wilson's house to execute the warrants, they found the front door open
and entered the house through an unlocked screen door. 4 Once inside,
the officers identified themselves and announced that they had a warrant
to search the house. 5  The officers seized narcotics, narcotic
paraphernalia, a gun and ammunition. 6 The officers found Wilson in
the bathroom, flushing marijuana down the toilet, arrested her and
Jacobs, and charged them with various narcotics crimes."
Wilson moved "to suppress the evidence seized ... on various
grounds,8 including that the officers had failed to 'knock and announce'
8 d. at 1919.
91d.
0 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1915.




"5 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1915.
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their presence before entering her home."' 9 The Court denied Wilson's
suppression motion,2 ° and she was convicted on all charges after a jury
trial.2 Wilson was sentenced to thirty-two years in prison.2"
Wilson appealed her conviction to the Arkansas Supreme
Court.23 In affirming her conviction, the Court determined that the
warrant issued to search Wilson's home was based on probable cause.24
The Court also found no authority to support Wilson's contention that
the Fourth Amendment requires compliance with the knock and
announce principle,25 and affirmed the lower court's denial of Wilson's
suppression motion as well1. 6
Wilson appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari "to resolve the conflict among the lower courts as to
whether the common law knock and announce principle forms a part of
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry."27 The Court held that
it does,28 reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court,29 and remanded the case
for further proceedings.3"
19 Id.
20 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1916.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Wilson v. State, 878 S.W.2d 755 (Ark. 1994).
24 Id. at 758. The Arkansas Supreme Court based its probable cause finding on a number
of considerations. Id. First, the Court noted that the officer's affidavit in support of the
search warrant recited that a confidential informant had purchased drugs from Wilson at her
home. Id. Second, the officer observed Wilson leave her home and proceed to a meeting
with the informant, where the officer observed a drug transaction. Id. The court ruled that
these facts supported the probable cause determination that Wilson possessed drugs at her
home, and therefore, a search warrant was justified. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1916 (footnote omitted).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. For a discussion of the issue that the Supreme Court remanded back to the Arkansas
Supreme Court, namely whether the search was "reasonable" notwithstanding the officers'
failure to knock and announce, see infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
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B. Reaction to the Wilson Decision
Media and scholarly reaction to the Wilson decision has been
mixed. Most agree, however, that the decision, which resolved "decades
of constitutional debate"'" over the knock and announce rule's
implications, was a win for defendants' rights.3" In fact, one author said
that the decision "should have an immediate practical impact [on
defendants' rights] by forcing police departments and law enforcement
agencies at all levels to re-examine their 'no-knock' and 'dynamic entry'
search and seizure policies."33 Also praised was the Court's decision to
leave to the lower courts the "task of determining the circumstances
under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."34 The Wilson decision has prompted concern as well.35
In light of the Court's unwillingness to clearly define the exceptions to
the knock and announce requirement,36 lower courts must remain
" Linda Greenhouse, In Home Searches, Police Must Knock, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1995, at B I0. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the relationship between the
knock and announce rule and the Fourth Amendment prior to Wilson, see infra notes 105-10
and accompanying text.
32 Id. (stating that Tracey Maclin, a Boston University law professor who filed the amicus
brief for the American Civil Liberties Union in Wilson, asserted that the Wilson decision
helps defendants by insuring that the police must have "some good reason before they start
knocking doors down"); see also Police Generally Must Announce Before Entering, Court
Decides, WASH. POST, May 23, 1995, at A6 [hereinafter Must Announce] (proclaiming that
the decision was a "rare win for defendants"); Marcia Coyle, The Justices Close Ranks on
'Knock and Announce, 'NAT'L L.J., June 5, 1995, at AI4 (reporting that the head of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers declared: "The Fourth Amendment
lives!").
3 Coyle, supra note 32.
4 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1919.
3 Greenhouse, supra note 31 (noting that "[i]t was unclear how, within the framework
of today's ruling, the Court might respond to a general rule permitting the police to make
unannounced, forced entries when the object of the search warrant was evidence of drug
dealing").
36 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1919. For a discussion of the exceptions to the knock and
announce rule, see infra notes 123-41 accompanying text.
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"vigilant to prevent [the] exceptions from overwhelming the rule. 37
Indeed, the Court's expansive approach to reasonableness may be "a
loophole that anyone can walk through."38 Although mixed, the reaction
to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson supports the conclusion that
the case will benefit defendants rather than the government.39
This Comment first examines the Fourth Amendment's scope
and traditional remedies for Fourth Amendment violations. Then, the
Comment discusses the scope and development of the knock and
announce principle, state interpretation of the rule, and exceptions to the
knock and announce rule. Having established the basic theories
underlying the knock and announce rule, the Comment examines the
Supreme Court's holding in Wilson. Finally, the Comment evaluates the
possible implications of Wilson and makes a recommendation regarding
necessary considerations in light of the ruling.
II. The Fourth Amendment
A. Scope
The Fourth Amendment4" secures the peoples' right "to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . *.". . " The principle purpose of the Fourth
" Must Announce, supra note 32.
38 Greenhouse, supra note 3 1. This concern stems from the Court's refusal to delineate
specific exceptions to the knock and announce requirement. Id. Instead, the Court left that
responsibility to the lower courts, while providing a minimal amount of guidance as to when
an officer can execute a search warrant without knocking and announcing his presence.
Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1919. For a discussion of the criticisms of the Court's refusal to outline
specific exceptions to the knock and announce rule, see infra notes 212-26 and
accompanying text.
" Greenhouse, supra note 31.
40 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
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Amendment is "to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and
oppressive interference by government officials."4
There is no precise formula to determine whether a particular
search is "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.43
Rather, the test of "reasonableness" requires an ad hoc balancing of two
competing interests:" (1) the government's need for the particular search
and (2) the effect of the search on the individual's Fourth Amendment
rights. 5 In balancing these interests, courts consider the scope of the
intrusion, the manner and place in which it is conducted, and the
justification for initiating it.46 Although "reasonableness" depends upon
42 U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653-54 (1979) (holding that "the essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth
Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials... in order to 'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions"') (citations omitted); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32 (1963)
(explaining that "[i]mplicit in the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures is its recognition of individual freedom"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27-28 (1949) (holding that "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police" is at the "core" of the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (explaining that "[t]he test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application"); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (explaining that the
determination of reasonableness must be decided on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case); see Ker, 374 U.S. at 33 (citing U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment is to be "liberally construed")).
4 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (holding that this balancing is the "key
principle of the Fourth Amendment"); U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (explaining
that reasonableness requires balancing of "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion"); Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (holding that "[i]n each case
[the test of reasonableness] requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against
the invasion of personal rights that the search entails"). Contra Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 219-20 (1979) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that balancing must not be done
in an "ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers").
4' Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8; Place, 462 U.S. at 703; Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
46 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8; Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
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the facts and circumstances of a particular case,47 those facts and
circumstances "must be viewed in light of established Fourth
Amendment principles."4 Because one of the factors to be considered
in determining "reasonableness" is the extent of the intrusion,49 the
manner in which the officers conduct the search is an inherent
consideration." The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
unreasonable federal and state searches alike, through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.5
4" Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8; Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
41 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969) (overruling U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 83 (1950), and citing Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion therein, that the test
of what is a "reasonable" search or seizure includes a consideration of "the history and the
experience which [the Fourth Amendment] embodies and the safeguards afforded by [the
Amendment] against the evils to which it was a response").
" Garner, 471 U.S. at 8; Place, 462 U.S. at 703.
"°See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8; see also Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 895 (holding that "[tihe Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable also may limit police use
of unnecessarily frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and investigation").
5 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (holding that evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in state
court); Ker, 374 U.S. at 33 (recognizing that the standard of reasonableness is the same
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Wolf 338 U.S. at 27-28 (stating that the
basic security of privacy against arbitrary police intrusion, although the core of the Fourth
Amendment, is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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B. Traditional Remedies for Fourth Amendment Violations
In 1914, in Weeks v. United States,2 the Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained in violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights cannot be used against that individual in a criminal prosecution. 3
This holding became known as the "Exclusionary Rule. '54 The main
goal of the Exclusionary Rule. was to deter government officials from
violating citizens' Fourth Amendment rights by making evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment unavailable for use in a
criminal prosecution." The rule was limited solely to actions of the
"federal government and its agencies."56 Therefore, even under the
Exclusionary Rule, a criminal court could not suppress evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by govemment officials
who acted in their individual capacity."
In 1961, however, the Supreme Court broadened the
applicability of the Exclusionary Rule. 8 In Mapp v. Ohio,59 the Court
held that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution is ... inadmissible in a state court."6  This holding
eliminated the distinction drawn in Weeks between searches conducted
52232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3 Id. at 391-93.
54 Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 210 (1960).
55 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393 (arguing that the protection of the Fourth Amendment would
be of no value if evidence obtained in violation thereof is admissible as evidence against the
accused). See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 647-48 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393); see also California
v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955) (holding that the most effective means of securing
compliance with constitutional provisions is to deem evidence obtained in violation of
constitutional guarantees inadmissible).
56 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398 (reasoning that because the Fourth Amendment only protects
individuals from unreasonable government searches and seizures, it "is not directed to
individual misconduct of [government] officials").
57 Id.
5 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
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by government officials acting of their own accord, and by officials
acting under the color of their official authority.6'
Jurisdictions that rejected the Exclusionary Rule provided other
ways to protect an individual's Fourth Amendment rights.62 Those ways
included the common law action for damages against the arresting
officer,6 3 against one who issues a warrant "maliciously and withoutprobable cause,"" and against a magistrate who has acted without
jurisdiction in issuing a warrant.65 Similarly, the common law provided
that an individual could, without liability, use force to resist an unlawful
search.66
In 1979, Congress codified the right of an individual to recover
monetary damages from government officials who violated the
individual's constitutional rights.67 The Supreme Court addressed this
remedy in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
61 For a discussion of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to government officials
acting under their own authority, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
62 Wolf 338 U.S. at 28-31 (concluding that because the decision in Weeks v. U.S., 232
U.S. 383, was "a matter ofjudicial implication," and not a ruling on the explicit requirements
of the Fourth Amendment, many individual states had reasonably refused to recognize the
exclusion of evidence as "an essential ingredient of the [Fourth Amendment] right").
63 Id. at 30 n.I (citations omitted).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 W'olf 338 U.S. at 30 n.1 (citations omitted).
6742 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or of the District of Columbia,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Narcotics.68 The Court observed that the Fourth Amendment does not
specifically "provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages
for the consequences of its violation."69 But, the Court concluded that
a monetary award of damages is nonetheless appropriate in the absence
of an "explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal
officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover damages
from the agents."7 Therefore, as long as the individual can demonstrate
an injury resulting from the officer's violation of his or her Fourth
Amendment rights, the individual "is entitled to redress his injury
through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the
federal courts."'"
The Supreme Court, however, has limited the statutory right of
individuals to recover money damages under the federal Civil Action for
Deprivation of Rights Law.72 Recognizing the societal costs of
68 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, agents from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, acting
under claim of federal authority and allegedly without a warrant, entered Bivens' apartment
and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations. Id. at 389. The agents allegedly
"manacled" Bivens in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest the entire
family. Id. After searching the apartment, the agents took Bivens to the federal courthouse
where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Id. Bivens sued
the agents in federal district court, alleging to have suffered "great humiliation,
embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' unlawful conduct." Id. at 389-
90. He sought $15,000 in damages from each agent. Id. at 390. The District Court
dismissed the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that it failed to state a cause of action. 276
F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 409 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1969).
69 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
70 /d. at 397.
71 Id. See, e.g., Patriarca v. Federal Bureau of Investigations, 639 F. Supp. 1193, 1198
(D.R.I. 1986) (holding that because the remedy that plaintiff sought fit "foursquare" within
the Supreme Court's opinion in Bivens, plaintiff could obtain relief against the government
defendants), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re Providence Journal Co., 829 F.2d 1342
(1st Cir. 1986); Sanabria v. Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding "a
cause of action in damages against a municipality available to an individual who has suffered
a constitutional deprivation").
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permitting damage suits against government officials, the Court held that
such officials performing discretionary functions may be provided with
"qualified immunity." 73 Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense that
must be pleaded by the government official at trial,74 shields the agent
from civil damages arising from the agent's violations of an individual's
constitutional rights.75  The availability of this "shield," however,
"generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action,"76
"assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the
time it was taken.
77
III. The Knock and Announce Rule
A. Scope and Development
At early English common law, the King's Bench recognized the
sheriffs ability to "break the party's house" to execute a search warrant. 8
In so holding, the King's Bench balanced the commonwealth's interest
in apprehending felons79 with the individual's interest in protecting his
72 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1987)
(discussing the availability of the qualified immunity defense); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 813-20 (1982) (holding that qualified immunity could be an alternative to absolute
immunity). See generally David P. Stoelting, Qualified Immunityfor Law Enforcement in
Section 1983, Excessive Force Cases, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 243,243-51 (1989) (examining the
applicability of the qualified immunity defense as applied to excessive force cases brought
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983).
" Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638.
14 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
" Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638-39; cf Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-07 (stating that in past
decisions "officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete
protection from suit" have been granted "absolute immunity") (citing Eastland v. U.S.
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)).
76 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).
77 Id.
78 Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).
79 Id. at 197.
674 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
home.8" The Court recognized the sanctity of the home and thus
required that the sheriff announce his purpose8" and request that the door
be opened before he "breaks" the door down. 2 Moreover, the sheriff
could not "break" the party's house if the doors were already open. 3
Semayne's Case4 is one of the earliest recognitions of the comimon law
knock and announce principle.85
Further early support for the knock and announce rule appeared
in the Case of Richard Curtis.6 In Curtis, the King's Bench specifically
held that before officers execute a search warrant, they must first
demand admittance87 and give "due notice of their warrant."88 But, the
Court stopped short of requiring any precise litany to satisfy the
announcement requirement.8 9 Rather, it was sufficient that the
individual received notice that the officers were there to execute valid
judicial process.9° Therefore, if the individual refused to admit the
"0 Id. at 195 (acknowledging that "the house of every one is to him as his castle and
fortress" and that "if thieves come to a man's house to rob him," he may defend his home
with deadly physical force (citations omitted); id. at 196 (recognizing that "great damage
and inconvenience" might result from unannounced entry).
81 Semayne, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195.
82 Id.
" Id. at 196 (holding that "if [the sheriff] breaks the house when he may enter without
breaking it (that is, on request made, or if he may open the door without breaking), he is a
trespasser") (citations omitted).
84 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
81 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1917 n.2 (stating that the "knock and announce" rule predates
Semayne's Case, which "is usually cited as the judicial source of the common law standard").
86 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (K.B. 1757).
87 Id. at 68.
88 Id.
89 1d.
90 Id. at 68; Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1917 (citing Lee v. Gansell, 98 Eng. Rep. 700, 705
(K.B. 1774) (holding that the door may be broken "when due notification and demand has
been made and refused")).
KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE
officers, he did so at his own peril,9 and the officer could break the door
down to execute the warrant.92
The knock and announce principle also gained early acceptance
in American statutory law.9a In as early as 1917, Congress codified the
requirement that officers knock and announce their presence before
executing a search warrant.94 On June 25, 1940, Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. section 3109, which provides:
The officer may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to
execute a search warrant, if, after notice
of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him
in the execution of the warrant.95
In Miller v. United States,96 the Supreme Court announced that Congress
"declared in [18 U.S.C.] §3109 the reverence of the law for the
individual's right of privacy in his house."97
9' Curtis, 168 Eng. Rep. at 68.
92 Id.
" Most of the states that ratified the Fourth Amendment-including New York, New
Jersey, and Virginia-gave credence to the English common law principle by enacting
statutes that required announcement prior to executing a search warrant. Wilson, 115 S. Ct.
at 1917. Moreover, several states-including Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and
New Jersey--enacted statutes permitting the breaking of the door of a dwelling once
admittance was refused. Id.
94 18 U.S.C. §§618, 619 (1940), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1994).
95 18 U.S.C. §3109 (1997).
96 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
97Miller, 357 U.S. at 313.
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It was not until 1958, in Miller v. United States, 98 that the
Supreme Court had its first opportunity to carve out the scope and
applicability of section 3109.9 In Miller, the Court held that federal
officers violated section 3109 when they broke down Miller's door
without expressly demanding admission or stating the purpose for their
presence.' 0 Therefore, the Court held, Miller's arrest was unlawful and
the evidence seized was suppressed under the Exclusionary Rule.' In
so holding, the Court concluded that "[t]he requirement of prior notice
of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply
rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application."'0 2
But, the Court stopped short of addressing the reasonableness of the
search in Fourth Amendment terms.
0 3
Until Wilson, °4 the relationship between the knock and
announce rule and the Fourth Amendment remained unclear. 10 5 Indeed,
prior to Wilson, the Supreme Court had defined the meaning of the term
" In Miller, Washington, D.C. police officers, upon a tip and without a warrant, knocked
on the door of Miller's apartment. Id. at 302-03. Upon Miller's inquiry, "Who's there?" the
officers replied "Police." Id. at 303. Miller opened the door slightly, but left the safety-
chain on, and asked the officers what they wanted. Id. Before the officers could answer,
however, Miller quickly attempted to close the door. Id. The officers reached in, broke the
chain, and forced the door open. Id. at 303-04. Once inside, the officers arrested Miller and
seized incriminating evidence that was later used against Miller at his trial. Id.
" See Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918 (describing Miller as an early acknowledgement that the
common law principle of announcement was "embedded in Anglo-American law"); Jennifer
M. Goddard, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock and Announce Rule: A
Callfor Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B.U. L. REv. 449, 459 (1995).
'00 Miller, 357 U.S. at 313-14.
'0' Id. at 314. For a discussion of the Exclusionary Rule, see supra notes 53-62 and
accompanying text.
02 Id. at 313.
'03 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918 n.3 (stating that in Miller, the Court focused on the statutory
requirement of announcement found in 18 U.S.C. section 3109 (1958 ed.), not on the
constitutional requirement of reasonableness).
104 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. 1914.
105 Id. at 1918; Goddard, supra note 99, at 450.
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"break open" in section 3109,1°6 and discussed circumstances under
which exigency may excuse compliance with the section. 7
Nevertheless, in as early as 1963, Justice Brennan, writing.for four
concurring Justices in Ker v. California,' recognized that the knock and
announce rule was a part of the Fourth Amendment.'0 9
Although the Fourth Amendment and section 3109 serve
overlapping purposes,"' section 3109 applies only to federal officers
executing a federal search warrant."' And, when state officers, acting
totally without federal involvement, seize evidence in violation of
section 3109 that is later offered in a federal prosecution, section 3109
'0 Sabbath v. U.S., 391 U.S. 585, 590 (1968) (holding that "'breaking' not only consists
of break[ing] down a door, forc[ing] open a chain lock on a partially opened door, or
open[ing] a locked door with a passkey, [but it also consists of] open[ing] a closed but
unlocked door").
107 Ker, 374 U.S. at 39-41 (explaining that such exigencies include the risk of destruction
of evidence, danger to police officers, or if announcement would frustrate the purpose of the
search (quoting California v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956))).
os 374 U.S. 23 (1963). In Ker, the officers, acting without a warrant, obtained a passkey
to Ker's apartment from the landlord and quietly entered the apartment. Id. at 28. Once
inside, the officers identified themselves as such to Ker and his wife. Id. The officers found
narcotics and arrested the Kers. Id. at 28-29.
109 Ker, 374 U.S. at 47-59.
"' U.S. v. Sagaribay, 982 F.2d 906, 909 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 160 (1993).
In Sagaribay, the Court explained that "[s]ection 3109 serves several Fourth Amendment
interests. Among those are (1) protecting law enforcement officers and household occupants
from potential violence; (2) preventing unnecessary destruction of private property; and (3)
protecting people from unnecessary intrusion into their private activities." Id. (citing United
States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1983)). But, the Court acknowledged that the overlap
between section 3109 and the Fourth Amendment is not always clear. Sagaribay, 982 F.2d
at 909.
... Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 588; United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 844 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829-30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965
(1979).
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will not apply." 2 Nonetheless, searches must always be "reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.""' 3
B. State Law and the Knock and Announce Rule
Despite apparent uniformity in federal statutory law, states
varied widely in their respective adoptions of knock and announce rules
through statutes and common law prior to Wilson. Before Wilson, at
least thirty-three states had statutes that required notice before entry to
execute a search warrant." 4 Nine states' statutes were silent on notice)15
12 U.S. v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Gatewood, 60 F.3d 248,
249 (6th Cir. 1995). See U.S. v. Murcer, 849 F. Supp. 288, 292 (D.Del. 1994), affd 52 F.3d
318 (3d Cir. 1995). Several factors to be considered in determining whether a search is
federal or state in nature include: (i) whether the warrant was issued under state law and
directed to state officers; (2) whether the warrant was predicated on probable violations of
state law; (3) whether federal agents assisted in obtaining the warrant; (4) whether federal
agents instigate or supervised the search; (5) whether the defendant was initially arrested by
local police officers; (6) whether the majority of the evidence was found by state officers;
(7) whether the product of the search, placed in the custody of local police, form the basis
of a state prosecution. Id. Afid, 52 F.3d 318 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 256 (1995).
113 See Valenzuela, 596 F.2d at 830 (holding that in determining whether a warrant was
properly executed, the general "reasonableness" standard is applicable).
... Brief for Petitioner at app. A, Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) (No. 94-
5707) (listing the states and statutes requiring notice). They are: Alabama (ALA.CODE § 15-
5-9) (1995), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§12.25.100 & 12.35.040) (Michie 1996), Arizona
(ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§13-3916(B) & 13-3891) (1996), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. §16-81-
107) (Michie 1995) (requiring notice of an entry solely to effect an arrest), California (CAL.
PENAL CODE §§844 & 1531) (West 1997), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§90 1.19(1) & 933.09)
(West 1997), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-27) (1996), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-
11 & 803-37) (1996), Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§19-61 1 & 19-4409) (1996), Indiana (IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-33-5-7) (West 1996), Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§804.15 & 808.6) (West 1996),
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. § 70.078) (Michie 1996), Louisiana (LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. arts. 164 & 224) (West 1997), Michigan (MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §28:880) (West
1996), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 629.34) (1996), Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § §41-29-
1579 & 99-3-11) (1996), Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.200) (West 1997), Nebraska
(NEB. REV. STAT. §29-411) (1996), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §§171.138 & 179.055(1))
(1995), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-58) (West 1996) (requiring notice only in liquor
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despite notice being required at common law.' 16  And, six states,
including Arkansas, had no general statutory or common law
requirement of notice before entry." 7
Even among those states that required officers to knock and
announce their presence before executing a search warrant, each state
interpreted the knock and announce rule differently. California, for
example, specifically prohibited judges from issuing no-knock warrants
altogether."8  To the contrary, several states' statutes permitted
magistrates to issue a search warrant that authorized entry without
notice." 9 The validity of these statutes in light of Wilson's unqualified
searches), New York (N.Y. CuM. PRO. LAW §§690.50 & 690.35(3)(b)) (McKinney Supp.
1997), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-251 & 15A-401) (1996), North Dakota
(N.D. CENT. CODE §§29-29-08 & 29-06-14) (1995), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§2935.12 & 2933.231(B)) (Anderson 1997), Oklahoma ( OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 §§ 197 &
1228) (1996), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 133.575(2))(1995), Pennsylvania (PA. CRIM. PRO.
§2007) (1997), South Dakota (S.D.CODIFIED LAWS §§23A-35-8 & 23A-35-9) (Michie
1996),Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§40-7-107) (1996), Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN.
art. 15.25 & 18.06(b)) (West 1997), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-7-8 & 77-23-210)
(1996), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §10.31.040) (West 1996), West Virginia
(W.VA.CODE §62-IA-5) (1996) and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. §§7-7-104) (Michie
1996).
. Id. at app. B (listing the states whose statutes are silent on notice by caselaw:
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Wisconsin, Vermont and Virginia).
116 Id.
I7 d. at app. D (listing the states and their statutes which do not require notice: Arkansas
(ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-107) (Michie 1995), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §16-3-
304(3)(b)) (1997), Illinois (ILL. COMP. STAT. 725.1.L.C.S. §5/108-8) (West 1996), Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2405(3) & 22-2508) (1995), Maryland (no statute applicable), and
New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §33:1-58) (West 1996).
... See Parsley v. Superior Court, 513 P.2d 611, 615 (Cal. 1973) (holding that advance
judicial approval will not justify an officer's unannounced entry); People v. Henderson, 129
Cal. Rptr. 844 (2d Dist. 1976) (re-affirming that the "failure of the officers to comply with
[California's knock and announce statute] cannot be predicated on judicial authorization
contained in the search warrant").
"9 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/108-8 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
29-157 (c)(2)(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §29-411(1994); N.Y. CRAM. PROC. LAW §
690.50(2)(b) (McKinney 1995).
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holding-that the knock and announce rule forms part of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness inquiryl20 -- is unclear.' 2'
C. Exceptions to the Knock and Announce Requirement
Similarly vulnerable after Wilson is Wisconsin's common law
"blanket rule" exception to the knock and announce requirement. 22 That
exception provides that when the subject of the search warrant is
narcotics, the police can dispense with the rule of announcement and
make a no-knock entry.'23 The reasoning behind this blanket exception
is that the "easily disposable nature of narcotics provides police with
evidence sufficient to form a reasonable belief that no-knock entry is
necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence." '124 For example, in
Wisconsin v. Stevens,'25 Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson concurred with
the majority's opinion that the evidence seized as part of the search of
20 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1915.
21 For a discussion of Wilson's effect on state law, see infra notes 187-211 and
accompanying text.
"'
2 See Wisconsin v. Stevens, 511 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Wis. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2245 (1995). In Stevens, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that:
[W]hen the police have a search warrant, supported
by probable cause, to search a residence for
evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of
possession with intent to deliver drugs 'evidence of
drug dealing,' they necessarily have reasonable
cause to believe exigent circumstances exist. Thus,
in all such searches the police are justified in
dispensing with the rule of announcement and
making a no-knock entry.
Id. at 595 (citations omitted); Wisconsin v. Ker, 511 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Wis. 1994) (holding
that no-knock entry was valid based on Stevens), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995); State
v. Gonzalez, 520 N.W.2d 290 (1994).
123 Stevens, 511 N.W.2d at 595; Ker, 511 N.W.2d at 590; Gonzalez, 520 N.W.2d at 290.
124 Stevens, 511 N.W.2d at 595.
12' 511 N.W.2d 591, 595 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995).
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defendant's home should not be suppressed. 2 6 Justice Abrahamson,
however, would not concur with the majority's blanket exception to the
knock and announce rule.'27 Justice Abrahamson argued that the
evidence was admissible because the likelihood that evidence will be
destroyed may excuse the officers from knocking and announcing their
presence before executing the warrant.'28 Thus, Justice Abrahamson
concluded, a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule was not
necessary.'2 9 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to this case.'30
At least one other jurisdiction has adopted a blanket exception to the
knock and announce rule.' 3 '
Most jurisdictions have specifically rejected any blanket
exception to the knock and announce rule.'32 But, this is not to say that
126 Stevens, 511 N.W.2d at 599-600. In Stevens, several members of the Green Bay
Police Department executed a search warrant at Bruce Stevens' home. Id. at 592. Because
the officer did not request a no-knock warrant, the warrant did not authorize a no-knock
entry. Id. The officers rang Stevens' doorbell and announced that they had a pizza delivery.
Id. When the officers realized that they were not going to gain entry as a result of this ruse,
they yelled: "Police, search warrant," and forced the door open and entered. Id.
Approximately four to five seconds passed between the time that the officers announced their
identity and broke the door open. Id. Once inside, the officers retrieved narcotics. Id. at
593. At the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the amount of time between
announcement and entry was inadequate, and suppressed the evidence retrieved. Id. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that in all cases where narcotics are the subject
of the search, "the police are justified in dispensing with the rule of announcement and




3' Stevens v. Wisconsin, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995), and Kerr v. Wisconsin,
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2245 (1995).
"' Murcer, 849 F. Supp. at 295 (holding that "when the form and quantities of drug
suspected to be present increase the likelihood that they can be easily destroyed," the blanket
exception to the knock and announce rule is appropriate).
132 See, e.g., Gaston v. Toledo, 665 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1995) (holding that the "sounder
view is 'that announcement is not required if, before arriving to search, the police have
particular reasons to reasonably believe in a particular case that evidence would be
destroyed' (citing State v. Gassner, 488 P.2d 822 (Or. Ct. App. 1971); United States v.
Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 850 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a blanket exception to the knock
682 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
every entry to execute a search warrant must be preceded by an
announcement. 33 Instead, where "exigent circumstances" exist, 34 the
officers need not knock and announce their presence before entering.
35
Such exigent circumstances include a threat of physical violence and the
destruction of evidence.'36 But, the mere presence of drugs and weapons
at the location to be searched, however, does not rise to exigency, per
se. 1
37
and announce rule in drug cases is "patently unjustifiable," and would result in the "violent
and intrusive execution of many search warrants"); Massachusetts v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d
818, 820-21 (Mass. 1982) (explaining that "there is no blanket exception to the knock and
announce rule which can be invoked where the object of the search is drugs"); California v.
Gastelo, 432 P.2d 706, 708 (Cal. i967).
Neither this court nor the United States Supreme
Court has held that unannounced forcible entries
may be authorized by a blanket rule based on the
type of crime or evidence involved ....
Unannounced forcible entry is in itself a serious
disturbance of [individuals' security in their homes]
and cannot be justified on a blanket basis. Id.
3 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918.
'4 For a discussion of what is an exigent circumstance, see supra note 107.
135 U.S. v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 939
(1995); see also U.S. v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1584 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 485
(1993); U.S. v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1354 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990);
U.S. v. Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the officers' belief that there
is an emergency situation must be objectively reasonable).
136 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918-19. See generally U.S. v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 754 (1996). There are six "touchstones" for determining the
existence of exigent circumstances, including: "(1) the gravity or violent nature of the
offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably
believed to be armed; ... and (6) the peaceful circumstances of the entry" (citing U.S. v.
Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1953 (1993)). The Court
also recognized the likelihood of the destruction of evidence as a circumstance
demonstrating exigency. Id.
'See U.S. v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581, 585 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the facts that the
defendant had once been seen with a pistol and was of Jamaican descent does not constitute
exigency); U.S. v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (9th Cir.) (holding that the critical
question is not simply whether drugs are on the premises, but whether that evidence was in
"imminent danger" of being destroyed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978), overruled by U.S.
1997] KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE 683
Moreover, exigent circumstances are not matters known to the
executing officers before the warrant was issued.138 And, the
government bears the burden of establishing that exigent circumstances
excused compliance with the knock and announce rule. 3 9 The ad hoc
determination of exigency appears to comport with the ad hoc
determination of "reasonableness" in Fourth Amendment terms. 140
IV. Wilson v. Arkansas
A. The Parties'Arguments and the Court's Holding
The parties' arguments in Wilson were fairly straight-forward,
given the narrow issue on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
4
'
v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); cf. California
v. Dumas, 512 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Cal. 1973) (holding that exigency excused compliance with
knock and announce rule where informant told officers that defendant habitually answered
the door armed with a firearm).
138 See Stewart, 867 F.2d at 585 (explaining that "[i]t is difficult to understand how the
circumstances were 'exigent' when the officers had an entire day to formulate a response to
those circumstances"); cf. Washington v. Jeter, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that exigent circumstances "must be based upon specific facts learned prior to
execution of the warrant or observed at the scene, in contrast to a generalized speculation by
law enforcement officers that their safety may be endangered or contraband destroyed"),
appeal denied, 96 Wash.2d 1027 (Wash. 1982).
"' U.S. v. Maden, 64 F.3d 1505, 1509 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the government
must demonstrate that exigent circumstances exist) (citing U.S. v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1064
(10th Cir. 1993)).
"0 For a discussion of the ad hoc determination of reasonableness, see supra notes 44-52
and accompanying text.
" Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995). The Court granted numerous
parties permission to file briefs as amicus curiae. Briefs for Amicus Curiae, Wilson v.
Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1916 (1995). Appearing in support of Wilson as petitioner were
the American Civil Liberties Union, the A.C.L.U. of Arkansas, and the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Among those appearing in support of Arkansas as respondent
were the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, Inc., the State of California, Wayne County, Michigan and the United
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Sharlene Wilson argued that "[t]he common law knock and announce
rule is so fundamental to our constitutional system that it must be
considered a part of the reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment."'42  Therefore, Wilson urged, the Fourth Amendment
requires officers executing a search warrant to knock and announce their
presence before entry, 43 unless exigent circumstances excuse such
announcement. 1
44
The State of Arkansas, to the contrary, argued that "[n]either the
text of the Fourth Amendment nor the Court's jurisprudence requires
police officers to knock and announce before executing a search
warrant."'145 The State contended that the existence of a valid search
warrant itself carries much weight in determining whether a particular
search was "reasonable" in Fourth Amendment terms. 146 Moreover, the
State suggested that the Court should adopt a blanket rule exception to
the knock and announce for narcotics.'47 In any event, the State argued
that exigent circumstances warranted the officers' non-compliance with
the knock and announce requirement.
48
States. Id.
'42 Brief for Petitioner at 29.
143 Id.
144 Id.
14' Brief for Respondent at 5.
146 Id.
14 Id. at 28.
141 Id. at 27-29. These circumstances included the likelihood of the destruction of
evidence and the potential of harm to the officers. Id. The State argued that because Wilson
was the subject of a narcotics investigation, the likelihood that she would destroy evidence
if the officers announced their presence was great. Id. Indeed, the State pointed out that this
likelihood was confirmed when the officers entered and found Wilson flushing marijuana
down the commode. Id. Moreover, the State maintained that the likelihood of physical
violence was also great because Wilson had threatened the police informant with a handgun,
and was "apparently ready to use deadly force to prevent her apprehension." Id. at 28. The
Supreme Court, in deciding this case, also implied that the fact that Wilson's housemate,
Jacobs, was previously convicted of firebombing also supported the conclusion that exigent
circumstances might excuse compliance with the knock and announce rule. Wilson, 115
S. Ct. at 1919.
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In response, Wilson argued, inter alia, that such a blanket
exception would violate the Fourth Amendment. 4 9 Specifically, Wilson
argued that because the knock and announce rule is a "reasonableness"
consideration in Fourth Amendment terms, to allow officers to dispense
with announcement when any of the indicia of exigency exists cuts
directly against the Fourth Amendment requirement that searches and
seizures be reasonable.'5
On March 28, 1995, the Court heard oral argument in the Wilson
case,' 5' and rendered its unanimous decision on May 22, 1995.5 The
Court held that the knock and announce rule forms a part of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement.' 53 In reaching its decision,
the Court "looked to the traditional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the
framing [of the Constitution]."'54 The Court found that these "traditional
protections" dictated that "the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling
may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced
their presence and authority prior to entering."' ' The Court concluded
that "[g]iven the longstanding common law endorsement of the practice
of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry into a dwelling
was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness
of a search or seizure."156
'4 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13-14.
!5o Id.
' ' United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, 1995 WL 243487 (U.S. Oral Arg.
1995). Counsel appeared for Sharlene Wilson, the State of Arkansas, and the United States.
Id.
152 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1915.




5 6 1d, at 1918.
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Moreover, the Court noted that not "every entry must be
preceded by an announcement,"'5 v observing that law enforcement
interests may outweigh the presumption in favor of announcement.58
Such interests may include the threat of physical violence and the
likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if the officers knock and
announce their presence before entering.'59 The Court did not give an
exhaustive list of these governmental interests. 61 Instead, the Court left
"to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under
which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."''
The Supreme Court therefore reversed the judgment of the
Arkansas Supreme Court, noting that exigent circumstances might well
have provided a "necessary justification for the unannounced entry in
this case."'162 The Court found that the Arkansas Supreme Court did not
address this issue sufficiently, however,'63 and remanded the case "to
allow the state court to make any necessary findings of fact and to make
the determination of reasonableness in the first instance."'164
'"Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918.
158 Id.
15 9 Id, at 1918-19.
16 0 Id. at 1919.
161 Id.
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V. The Effect of Wilson v. Arkansas
A. General Considerations of Requiring Officers to
Knock and Announce Their Presence Before
Executing a Warrant
The knock and announce rule consists of several elements.' 65
These elements include the amount of time that an officer must wait
between announcing his presence and breaking in,'66 and the particular
litany required to constitute proper announcement.'67 Although these
elements are important considerations in determining whether the
officers have complied with the knock and announce rule, courts have
not been uniform in their evaluations of these elements. 168 Now that the
knock and announce rule is a factor to be considered in determining
whether a search is "reasonable" in Fourth Amendment terms, such a
165 For a discussion of the knock and announce rule, see supra notes 79-140 and
accompanying text.
66 See Poole v. U.S., 630 A.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the time
of day or night is a factor to consider when determining the amount of time that must exist
between announcement and forced entry; ten seconds not enough time), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 160 (1994); Hawaii v. Garcia, 887 P.2d 671, 679 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that ten
seconds between announcement and breaking down the door was "clearly insufficient to
afford the occupants a reasonable opportunity to open the doors"); Illinois v. Saechao, 544
N.E.2d 745, 750 (I11. 989) (holding that five to ten seconds between announcement and
breaking was sufficient); Nebraska v. Moore, 535 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that "[sipeculation as to how long police officers must wait before making entry
after knocking should be subject to a reasonableness rule under all circumstances").
67 See Garcia, 887 P.2d at 675 (providing that an officer attempting to make an entry
must meet three requirements before breaking into the place to be searched: "that the officer
state his or her office, that he or she state his or her business, and that he or she demand
entrance"). Cf. Saechao, 544 N.E.2d at 745 (holding that announcement was proper even
if officer did not announce his purpose but merely stated that he was from the Sheriffs
office).
68 For a discussion of the inconsistencies in state courts' determinations on compliance
with the knock and announce rule, see infra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
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lack ofjudicial uniformity cannot stand. 69 The inconsistent application
of how long an officer must wait between announcing his presence and
entering is one example of the lack of judicial uniformity. 7° Some
courts have held that as few as five seconds is a sufficient amount of
time. 7' Others have held that ten seconds is "clearly insufficient."'
' 72
Still other jurisdictions take a more ad hoc approach, considering the
time of the day or night,7 3 and the overall reasonableness of the length
of time that the officers waited.' This inconsistent application of the
law leaves officers unable to determine whether their actions will violate
an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, traditional
remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, such as the Exclusionary
Rule, 175 may not be appropriate. As discussed above, the main goal of
the Exclusionary Rule is to deter government agents from engaging in
Fourth Amendment violative searches. 76 But, because officers are
unable to determine whether they have waited a sufficient amount of
time between announcement and breaking, the Exclusionary Rule will
not serve this deterrent goal. 7 7 That is, officers cannot refrain from
169 But see Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918 (holding that "[t]he Fourth Amendment's flexible
requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement
that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests"). For a discussion on the effect of
Wilson on state laws, see infra notes 187-211 and accompanying text.
7' For a discussion on the inconsistencies in the length of time required between an
officer's announcement and his entry, see infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
... See, e.g., Saechao, 544 N.E.2d at 750 (holding that five to ten seconds between
announcement and entering was sufficient).
"' See, e.g., Garcia, 887 P.2d at 679.
171 See, e.g., Poole, 630 A.2d at 1117.
17 See Moore, 535 N.W.2d at 420.
17' For a discussion of the traditional remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, see
supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
176 For a discussion of the Exclusionary Rule, see supra notes 52-78 and accompanying
text.
7 See Wilson, 115 S. Ct at 1918, 1919 (stating that the Fourth Amendment "should not
be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcements that ignores countervailing law
enforcement interests, "and leaving it to lower courts to deal with knock and announce
requirements on case-by-case basis). For example, on the issue of unannounced entry, the
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engaging in Fourth Amendment violative searches if they do not even
know whether they are violating a person's Fourth Amendment rights by
waiting five seconds between announcement and entry.178
Another element of the knock and announce rule is the specific
type of announcement that is necessary to predicate a breaking. That is:
What must the officer say and do before he breaks the door down? 79
This element is also in a state of jurisdictional flux.' Some
jurisdictions require that the officer specify his or her office, that he or
she has a warrant, and that the officer demand entry.'' Other
jurisdictions have held that an officer need not announce his purpose if
the resident was already made aware of the officer's presence.'82 This
court in Wilson held that while "a search of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective
if officers enter without prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also establish
the reasonableness of an unannounced entry." Id. at 1919. Compare Garcia, 887 P.2d at
675 (holding that ten seconds was not enough time) with Saechao, 544 N.E.2d at 750
(holding that five to ten seconds was sufficient time between knock and entry).
'78 For a discussion of the inconsistencies in state courts' findings regarding the amount
of time required between knocking and entry, see supra notes 171-75 and accompanying
text.
' See Garcia, 887 P.2d at 675 (providing the following three steps for an officer to meet
before he breaks into the place to be searched: "that the officer state his or her office, that
he or she state his or her business, and that he or she demand entrance"); see also Saechao,
544 N.E.2d at 749-50 (holding that resident was aware of officer's purpose when officer
knocked at door, announced that he was from the sheriffs office, and requested admittance).
180 See generally George E. Dix, An Exclusionary Rule Showdown: The US. Court's
Holding in Wilson v. Arkansas Will Make the Court of Criminal Appeals Address a Number
of Fourth Amendment Entry Issues it Has Been Able to Ignore, TEXAS LAWYER, July 10,
1995, at 26 (stating that in Wilson, "[n]o guidance was provided as to the kind of
announcement constitutionally mandated," and noting that state approaches vary, from being
"no different" than Wilson, to being more demanding).
... Garcia, 887 P.2d at 675.
.82 See Saechao, 544 N.E.2d at 745 (noting that where officers knocked on door and
identified themselves as police officers, "it cannot be said that the residents were not made
aware of the law enforcement officers' purpose").
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leaves officers unable to determine what type of announcement is
necessary to predicate a breaking.'83
In sum, a result of the Supreme Court's Wilson holding is that the
Court must now clearly define the knock and announce requirement.
Indeed, to the extent that the Exclusionary Rule's goal is to deter,'84 that
deterrent will not be effective because officers do not know what kind
of announcement is required, and how long they must wait before
breaking in.' 85
B. Wilson's Effect on State Law
The Wilson holding will also have a significant impact on state
search and seizure law.' 86 Specifically, Wisconsin's "blanket rule"
183 See Dix, supra note 180, at 26 (suggesting that the court should have given guidance
"as to the kind of announcement constitutionally mandated").
184 For a discussion of the deterrent goal of the Exclusionary Rule, see supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
185 Compare Garcia, 887 P.2d at 677 (holding that ten seconds not enough time between
knock and entry, and announcement of purpose necessary), with Saechao, 544 N.E.2d at 750
(holding that five to ten seconds between knock and entry is sufficient, and specific
announcement of purpose not necessary but may be implied from officers' presence). Such
a case by case basis might present police officers with an infinite variety of search situations.
See, e.g., Dix, supra note 180 (noting that lower courts will now have to determine how long
police officers must wait before forcibly entering a dwelling). Dix asks what "the sound of
scurrying feet" might mean to an officer, that is, whether it might mean an attempt to destroy
evidence, resist the officers, or simply get dressed to prepare "to submit to the search with
a minimum of personal embarrassment." Id.
16 See generally Dix, supra note 180 (discussing Wilson's impact on state law and
suggesting that "Wilson will require that the Texas courts and many others considerably
modify their approach," that the decision "will require state courts... to address 'in the first
instance' a number of Fourth Amendment entry issues that they have up to now been able
to ignore," and "will require quite extensive reconsideration of prior entry case law").
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exception to the knock and announce requirement' 17 is now vulnerable
to constitutional attack.'
Blanket rule exceptions allow government agents to dispense
with the announcement requirement whenever the subject of the search
is narcotics.8 9  No advance judicial authorization is required and,
because of the "easily disposable nature of narcotics, '"9 the likelihood
that the narcotics will be destroyed is irrelevant.' 9' Therefore, officers
may use a battering ram to crash through a person's front door armed
only with a valid search warrant to justify this intrusion.' 92 This result
hardly comports with the Wilson holding that knocking and announcing
is part of what makes a search reasonable in Fourth Amendment terms.
s For a discussion of Wisconsin's blanket rule exception to the knock and announce rule,
see supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
..8 On March 25, 1997, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Richards v. Wisconsin,
(1997 U.S. LEXIS 2794). Steiney J. Richards was convicted in 1992 for narcotics sales.
The officers, after obtaining a no-knock warrant, entered Richards' hotel room and seized
cocaine, without announcing their presence. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for
felony drug investigations." Thus, the Court overruled the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
holding "that exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock are always present in felony drug
cases." However, the Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision to
the extent that exigent circumstances existed in this particular case sufficient to justify the
officers' entry without first knocking and announcing their presence. See, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, Court Rejects Special Rules for Drug Searches, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1997, at
A14. See also John Nussbaumer, "Knock Knock " "Who's There?" Must Police Knock and
Announce Themselves Before Entering a Home to Execute a Search Warrant?, PREVIEW OF
U.S. SUP. CT. CASES, Mar. 7, 1995, at 6 (arguing that this kind of blanket exception "might
not pass constitutional muster").
89 For a discussion of blanket exceptions to the knock and announce rule, see supra notes
123-32 and accompanying text.
" Wisconsin v. Stevens, 511 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Wis. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2245
(1995).
191 Id.
192 See Moore v. Alabama, 650 So.2d 958, 960 (Ala. 1994) (stating that the fact that
officers entered by "bashing the door with a battering ram" is not an issue on appeal).
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Indeed, several jurisdictions have specifically rejected the
blanket exception rule.' 93 These jurisdictions hold that such exceptions
would result in an increase in the "violent and intrusive" execution of
search warrants, 194 and that unannounced forcible entry is such a
disturbance of an individual's security in his home that it "cannot be
justified on a blanket basis.'"" Therefore, the Supreme Court must
either overrule Wisconsin's common law blanket exception to the knock
and announce rule,19 6 or recognize such an exception as a valid
circumstance under which officers need not comply with the
announcement requirement.' 97
Similarly, Texas has allowed officers to employ extravagant
means to execute a search warrant.' 9 On, June 10, 1990, Dallas police
executed a search warrant on Juan Garcia's Dallas residence.' 99 The
officers used what is known as a "stun grenade" to gain access to
Garcia's home. 00 This "grenade" is a diversionary device that "explodes
with a loud noise and a bright flash but has no shrapnel.""'' The device
"stuns" the occupants of the house so that the officers can enter and
secure the premises without opposition 202 After the officers threw the
tg' For a discussion of the many jurisdictions that have rejected the blanket exception rule,
see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
19' U.S. v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 850 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a blanket rule
permitting no-knock warrants in all drug cases, regardless of the form and quantity suspected
to be present, is "patently unjustifiable").
"' California v. Gastelo, 432 P.2d 706, 708 (Cal. 1967) (observing that "[n]either [the
California Supreme Court] nor the United States Supreme Court has held that unannounced
forcible entries may be authorized by a blanket rule based on the type of crime or evidence
involved").
'" See Wisconsin v. Williams, 485 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Wis. 1992) (holding that a person in
possession of drugs and firearms poses such a great threat to law enforcement that these
exigent circumstances justify 'an unannounced entry).
197 Id.
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grenade into Garcia's home and secured it, they found not only Garcia
in the apartment, but also his pregnant wife and two children, ages nine
months and two years." 3 Upon appealing his conviction, Garcia did not
challenge the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the search." 4
After Wilson, such an unannounced forced entry will probably
not stand.0 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court pointed out in Tennessee v.
Garner0 6 and United States v. Ortiz2.7 that the manner in which a search
or seizure is carried out is a consideration in determining whether a
search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.08
And, because the search was not preceded by announcement, Wilson will
likely prohibit such a search as well.
203 Dix, supra note 180.
204 Id.
20' See, e.g., U.S. v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that law
enforcement agents can force entry only after the circumstances lead them to reasonably infer
they have been refused admittance).
206 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985). The police, in response to a "prowler inside call," arrived at
a Memphis home. Id. at 3-4. A woman standing on a porch gestured toward the adjacent
house, and told the officer that someone was trying to break into that house. Id. One of the
officers approached the adjacent house and saw Edward Garner fleeing across the backyard.
Id. The officer cornered Garner against a chain link fence and Garner crouched down next
to the fence. Id. When the officer yelled "police, halt," Garner began to climb over the
fence. Id. The officer shot Garner in the back of the head, and Garner died soon thereafter.
Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the use of
deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon. Id. at 3.
20' 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975). Border patrol officers stopped Ortiz's car for a routine
immigration search at a traffic checkpoint. Id. They found three aliens in the trunk, and
Ortiz was convicted of knowingly transporting illegal aliens. Id. The Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment forbids border patrol officers, without consent or probable cause,
from searching private vehicles at traffic checkpoints removed from the border and its
"functional equivalents." Id.
208 For a discussion of the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, see
supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
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In sum, Wilson will have an impact on state law.2 °9 It will
require the Supreme Court to more clearly define the components of the
knock and announce rule." '° It will also have a significant impact on
those states that have blanket exceptions to the knock and announce
requirement, and on those that allow officers to employ particularly
intrusive means to execute a warrant.
C. Wilson's Effect on Exceptions to
the Knock and Announce Rule
The Wilson Court refused to delineate exceptions under which
non-compliance with the knock and announce rule may be excused.2 '
Instead, the Court left that task to the lower state and federal courts." 2
The Court's refusal to address the issue of exceptions has prompted
criticism.2"3 Indeed, Linda Greenhouse of The New York Times has
classified the refusal as a "loophole."2 4 ' Tracey Maclin, a Boston
University law professor who filed the brief for the American Civil
Liberties Union in Wilson,2"5 stated that "the court's approach to the
question of reasonableness might prove to be 'a loophole that anyone can
walk through.""'2 6  Indeed, the Court left almost as many issues
concerning Fourth Amendment reasonableness unresolved as it resolved
209 See, e.g., New Jersey v. Jones, 667 A.2d 1043, 1050 (N.J. 1995) (noting that "[f]ailure
to adhere strictly to common law knock and announce requirement is obviated by the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Wilson v. Arkansas.").
20 U.S. v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409 (9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (noting the
variety of factors that can be considered when balancing the reasonableness of an
unannounced entry).
2' Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1919.
212 Id.
213 Greenhouse, supra note 3 1.
2 14 Id.
215 See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae at 1, Wilson v.
Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995).
216 Id.
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by holding that the knock and announce rule is part of that
reasonableness.
217
The Court's refusal to delineate exceptions came under attack
from another direction as well. 18 Specifically, in the context of the
"totality of the circumstances" approach to reasonableness. 219 One
author, Ira Mickenberg, has interpreted Wilson to hold that such an
approach "allows and encourages" states to develop additional grounds
for holding entries reasonable.220 Mr. Mickenberg continues that
"[u]nder the totality-of-the-circumstances scale, virtually any denial of
suppression can be justified because there are no clear standards by
which to evaluate a constitutional violation. 22'
However, this totality of the circumstances approach has always
been the scale upon which Fourth Amendment reasonableness has been
measured.2 22  Indeed, it is well-settled that exigency may excuse
compliance with the knock and announce rule.223 Moreover, exigency
requires an ad hoc, on the scene assessment of possible dangers to the
officers or the likelihood of the destruction of evidence.224 But, Mr.
Mickenberg's argument gains strength when considered in the context
of the Wilson Court's refusal to specify what exceptions may excuse
compliance with the knock and announce rule.225
217 See supra notes 42-52, and accompanying text for a discussion of the "reasonableness"
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
28 Ira Mickenberg, Court Settles on Narrower View of 4th Amendment, NAT'L L.J., July
31, 1995, at C8.
29 See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
220 Mickenberg, supra note 218.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 For a discussion of the ad hoc determination of "reasonableness" in Fourth Amendment
terms, see supra notes 44-52, and accompanying text.
224 Id.
225 We need not attempt a comprehensive catalog of
the relevant countervailing factors here. For now,
we leave to the lower courts the task of determining
the circumstances under which an unannounced
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D. The Extent to Which Wilson Provides New
Remedies and Limits Old Remedies
The Exclusionary Rule, one traditional remedy to redress
violations of Fourth Amendment rights, 26 has also been used to redress
violations of the knock and announce rule.22 7 But, as discussed below,
other remedies, which have been typically used to protect individuals
from violations of the Fourth Amendment, have not been extended to
protect individuals from violations of the knock and announce
requirement.22
Monetary damages, for example, have been an available remedy
for an individual who has suffered injuries from a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights by federal officials.229 However, in Rivera v. US.,230
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
specifically held that "there is no basis for a private right of action for
money damages against [government agents who violate the federal
entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
We simply hold that although a search or seizure of
a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if
police officers enter without prior announcement,
law enforcement interests may also establish
reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Wilson,
115 S. Ct. at 1918-19.
226 See supra notes 54 to 62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Exclusionary
Rule.
2 27 Id.
2.8 See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fourth
Amendment remedies that have not been extended to violations of the knock and announce
rule.
"
29 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) (holding that a monetary award of damages is an appropriate remedy for an
individual whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by a government official).
230 728 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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knock and announce statute]."23' In so holding, the Court discussed
Congress' intent in enacting section 3109, construed the explicit and
implicit provisions of the statute, and considered the legislative history
of section 3109.232 These considerations, in light of the lack of judicial
precedent,233 led the court to conclude that a violation of section 3109
does not provide a private cause of action for a violation of the knock
and announce rule.234
VI. Conclusion
By specifically holding that the knock and announce rule is part
of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, 235 Wilson v.
Arkansas has re-defined the knock and announce rule. It will impact
state law,236 limit civil remedies for individuals whose Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated,2 37 and render the Exclusionary
Rule ineffective.23 The Supreme Court will be forced to act quickly to
231 Rivera, 728 F. Supp. at 262. Officers searched Garcia's apartment and two other
apartments armed with a search warrant. Id. at 252-53. The apartment owners, including
Garcia, claimed, inter alia, that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights in
conducting the searches. Id. at 253. They also claimed that the officers committed the
common law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, among others.
Id. As a threshold legal issue to the parties' claim that a private actions stems from the
officers' failure to comply with 18 U.S.C. section 3109-the federal knock and announce
statute-the Court District Court held that "there is no basis for a private right of action for
money damages against the defendants." Id.
232 Id. at 263.
233 Id. at 264 (finding that "[n]o case has been cited or located in which a court has found
a private right of action as a remedy for violation of the knock-and-announce statute").
2 34 Id. at 187.
23 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1915.
236 For a discussion of Wilson's effect on state law, see supra notes 187-211 and
accompanying text.
237 For a discussion of Wilson's effect on remedies for Fourth Amendment violatfons, see
supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
23 Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1915.
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more clearly define the scope and impact of violations of the knock and
announce requirement. In sum, by holding that the knock and announce
principle forms part of the reasonableness inquiry of the Fourth
Amendment,239 the Court has indeed given content to the Fourth
Amendment requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable. But,
in so holding, the Court must now give content to the knock and
announce rule.
Brent P. Reilly
2 3 9 Id
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